Do individuation instructions reduce the cross-race effect? A registered replication of Hugenberg, Miller, and Claypool (2007)

Abstract

People usually have less accurate memory for cross-race (CR) than for same-race (SR) faces, a robust and consequential phenomenon known as the Cross-Race Effect (CRE). In an influential paper, Hugenberg et al. (2007) showed that the CRE can be eliminated when participants are instructed to individuate CR faces in order to avoid displaying this effect. This finding has received widespread attention, and many studies have attempted to replicate it, with mixed results. In the present research, we attempted to replicate the effect of the individuation instructions in eliminating the CRE (Hugenberg et al., 2007) in two pre-registered experiments in two different cultures – the United States and Portugal. The results of both experiments found no evidence that instructing participants to individuate CR faces eliminates or even attenuates the CRE. Additionally, we also examined and failed to find support for the idea that these individuation instructions are more effective for the participants who report greater contact with CR faces (Young & Hugenberg, 2012). Finally, we also did not find evidence that the cultural setting moderates the effect of the individuation instructions of the CRE. We critically discuss the potential reasons for the lack of impact on the individuation instructions in the CRE and its implications for a prominent motivational account of this effect.

Francisco Cruz

Doctoral Student

Francisco Cruz is a doctoral student in social psychology at the Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon, under the supervision of Prof. André Mata (University of Lisbon) and Prof. Tania Lombrozo (Princeton University). Currently, he is visiting Princeton University in research collaborator capacity. His project explores why people are sceptical of psychology as a science, as well as how to increase trust in psychological science. His research interests include lay beliefs about science (i.e., what people believe that science can or cannot explain and why), motivated beliefs in science (i.e., the contexts in which people are more prone to accepting scientific explanations), representation of social groups (i.e., how people integrate information to provide judgments on shared homogeneity vs. heterogeneity across group members), epistemic trespassing (i.e., when people provide judgments on domains beyond those in which they are experts), intuitive mind-body dualism (i.e., a natural tendency to see the world as split in material and immaterial portions), and face perception (i.e., features driving the advantage in recall for own- vs. other-race faces). He is a Student Affiliate at the Center for the Science of Moral Understanding, an Author at CogBites, and an Opinion Editor at Cruamente.