Learned attentional strategies in word holistic processing

Abstract

Previous research has shown that, like faces, words are processed either holistically or through the automatic representation of their parts combined. The automaticity assumed to underlie the holistic processing of words presupposes that individuals have a relatively low level of control over these processes. However, they may also be capable of learning from their environments whether processing words as a whole is the most efficient processing strategy—which would require at least some control over the corresponding processes. In fact, previous research supports this latter account in the context of the holistic processing of faces. When provided a task in which participants should ignore half of a stimuli (the irrelevant part) and pay selective attention to the other half (the target part), the participants become better at ignoring the irrelevant part when it is commonly misleading (i.e., this suggests a response that is different from that of the relevant part in the context of the task). In the present work, we extend these considerations to holistic word processing. Our results support a learned attentional account in the context of holistic word processing. When an irrelevant word part is systematically helpful for the judgment of a target word half, participants engage more in holistic processing (vs. when the irrelevant word half is misleading). This reflects an incidental statistical learning process in which individuals identify the irrelevant word half as either providing helpful or misleading information about the target half.

Francisco Cruz

Doctoral Student

Francisco Cruz is a doctoral student in social psychology at the Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon, under the supervision of Prof. André Mata (University of Lisbon) and Prof. Tania Lombrozo (Princeton University). Currently, he is visiting Princeton University in research collaborator capacity. His project explores why people are sceptical of psychology as a science, as well as how to increase trust in psychological science. His research interests include lay beliefs about science (i.e., what people believe that science can or cannot explain and why), motivated beliefs in science (i.e., the contexts in which people are more prone to accepting scientific explanations), representation of social groups (i.e., how people integrate information to provide judgments on shared homogeneity vs. heterogeneity across group members), epistemic trespassing (i.e., when people provide judgments on domains beyond those in which they are experts), intuitive mind-body dualism (i.e., a natural tendency to see the world as split in material and immaterial portions), and face perception (i.e., features driving the advantage in recall for own- vs. other-race faces). He is a Student Affiliate at the Center for the Science of Moral Understanding, an Author at CogBites, and an Opinion Editor at Cruamente.