Self-serving beliefs about science: Science justifies my weaknesses (but not other people’s)
Abstract
This research explored the strategic beliefs that people have about science and the extent to which it can explain moral and immoral behaviors. Although people do not believe that science is able to explain certain aspects of their mind, they might nevertheless accept a scientific explanation for their immoral behaviors if that explanation is exculpatory. In a first study, participants reflected on moral and immoral deeds that they performed or that other people performed. Participants were somewhat skeptic that science can account for people’s behavior—except for when they reflected on the wrongdoings that they committed. Two further studies suggest that strategic belief in science arises because it enables external attributions for the behavior, outside of the wrongdoers’ control. Implications are discussed for science understanding and communication.
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Francisco Cruz
Invited Assistant Professor
Francisco Cruz is an invited assistant professor in psychology, statistics, and methods at the Faculdade de Psicologia, Universidade de Lisboa, and Faculdade de Ciências da Saúde, Universidade Europeia. Junior Consulting Editor at the Journal of European Social Psychology, 2025-present. Social Psychology Ph.D. on lay beliefs about science, supervised by Prof. André Mata (Universidade de Lisboa) and Prof. Tania Lombrozo (Princeton University), 2022-2025. Visiting Student Research Collaborator at Princeton University, 2023-2024. Society for General Psychology and Interdisciplinary Inquiry, Fulbright Portugal, and Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia awardee. His research interests include lay beliefs about science (i.e., what people believe that science can or cannot explain and why), motivated beliefs in science (i.e., the contexts in which people are more prone to accepting scientific explanations), representation of social groups (i.e., how people integrate information to provide judgments on shared homogeneity vs. heterogeneity across group members), epistemic trespassing (i.e., when people provide judgments on domains beyond those in which they are experts), intuitive mind-body dualism (i.e., a natural tendency to see the world as split in material and immaterial portions), and face perception (i.e., features driving the advantage in recall for own- vs. other-race faces).