The effect of face race on metamemory: Examining its robustness and underlying mechanisms

Abstract

Perceivers typically exhibit better recognition memory for same-race faces than for cross-race faces, a phenomenon known as the cross-race effect (CRE). Despite its ubiquity, it is yet unclear whether people are metacognitively aware of the CRE. This research thoroughly investigates perceivers’ metacognitive awareness of the CRE across five experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that both prospective (judgments of learning) and retrospective (confidence) metamemory judgments are sensitive to variations in the racial category and prototypicality of faces. Experiment 3 showed that participants’ item-level prospective judgments are informed by beliefs about the impact of face race on memory performance. Experiment 4 revealed that global predictions are influenced by face race in the absence of direct stimulus experience, emphasizing the role of preexisting beliefs. Experiment 5 extended these findings by showing large crossover interactions between face race and participant race in both global predictions and item-level prospective judgments, indicating that both White and Black participants have higher metamemory estimates for ingroup faces. This experiment further showed that preexisting beliefs intensify the impact of face race on metamemory judgments yet do not fully account for it. Collectively, these experiments provide robust evidence of good metamemory accuracy for faces varying in racial categories and prototypicality among White participants and demonstrate that beliefs underlie the effect of face race on metamemory judgments among both White and Black participants, though this may not be the only mechanism involved.

Francisco Cruz

Doctoral Student

Francisco Cruz is a doctoral student in social psychology at the Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon, under the supervision of Prof. André Mata (University of Lisbon) and Prof. Tania Lombrozo (Princeton University). Currently, he is visiting Princeton University in research collaborator capacity. His project explores why people are sceptical of psychology as a science, as well as how to increase trust in psychological science. His research interests include lay beliefs about science (i.e., what people believe that science can or cannot explain and why), motivated beliefs in science (i.e., the contexts in which people are more prone to accepting scientific explanations), representation of social groups (i.e., how people integrate information to provide judgments on shared homogeneity vs. heterogeneity across group members), epistemic trespassing (i.e., when people provide judgments on domains beyond those in which they are experts), intuitive mind-body dualism (i.e., a natural tendency to see the world as split in material and immaterial portions), and face perception (i.e., features driving the advantage in recall for own- vs. other-race faces). He is a Student Affiliate at the Center for the Science of Moral Understanding, an Author at CogBites, and an Opinion Editor at Cruamente.