The spirit is noble, but the flesh is corrupt: Lay beliefs about the bases of (im)moral behavior
Abstract
In four studies, we explored the relation between mind-body dualism and morality, specifically, whether people associate whether the basis for a behavior is material (e.g., brain) or immaterial (e.g., soul) with the behavior’s morality. We expected immaterial bases (more than material ones) to be associated with moral behaviors, as a) immaterial-based behaviors should be seen as more reflecting people’s true self, and b) the true self tends to be seen as fundamentally good. In Study 1, participants indicated that behaviors brought about by an agent’s soul were more likely to be moral than those prompted by their brain. In Study 2, behaviors presented as stemming from an agent’s soul (vs. brain) were rated higher in attributions of true self. In Study 3, behaviors described as reflecting the agent’s true self were considered more moral than those lacking in these properties. In Study 4, we replicated Study 1’s finding that people expect behaviors prompted by a soul to be moral, and we also observed self-other differences such that participants ascribed more soul-based and moral behaviors to themselves than to other people.
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Francisco Cruz
Doctoral Student
Francisco Cruz is a doctoral student in social psychology at the Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon, under the supervision of Prof. André Mata (University of Lisbon) and Prof. Tania Lombrozo (Princeton University). Currently, he is visiting Princeton University in research collaborator capacity. His project explores why people are sceptical of psychology as a science, as well as how to increase trust in psychological science. His research interests include lay beliefs about science (i.e., what people believe that science can or cannot explain and why), motivated beliefs in science (i.e., the contexts in which people are more prone to accepting scientific explanations), representation of social groups (i.e., how people integrate information to provide judgments on shared homogeneity vs. heterogeneity across group members), epistemic trespassing (i.e., when people provide judgments on domains beyond those in which they are experts), intuitive mind-body dualism (i.e., a natural tendency to see the world as split in material and immaterial portions), and face perception (i.e., features driving the advantage in recall for own- vs. other-race faces). He is a Student Affiliate at the Center for the Science of Moral Understanding, an Author at CogBites, and an Opinion Editor at Cruamente.