Abstract
Human face processing relies heavily on configural processing—the ability to perceive the spatial relationships between facial features—rather than on processing individual features in isolation. In this study, we explored configural processing of faces in paintings, comparing artworks along a realism/distortion continuum, including Renaissance, Postimpressionism, Expressionism, and Cubism. To test competing hypotheses regarding a possible modulation by art style in relational processing, we asked how inversion hinders configural processing of faces in paintings. We found gradation in relational processing, with an inversion effect for Renaissance and Postimpressionism face paintings but no inversion effect for Expressionism and Cubism face paintings. Distortion in the positioning of facial features introduced in Expressionism and Cubism is most probably related to the lesser importance of relational processing in these art styles, whereas the higher realism of faces in Renaissance and Postimpressionist paintings fosters the recruitment of mechanisms involved in the processing of real faces.
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Francisco Cruz
Invited Assistant Professor
Francisco Cruz is an invited assistant professor in psychology, statistics, and methods at the Faculdade de Psicologia, Universidade de Lisboa, and Faculdade de Ciências da Saúde, Universidade Europeia. Junior Consulting Editor at the Journal of European Social Psychology, 2025-present. Social Psychology Ph.D. on lay beliefs about science, supervised by Prof. André Mata (Universidade de Lisboa) and Prof. Tania Lombrozo (Princeton University), 2022-2025. Visiting Student Research Collaborator at Princeton University, 2023-2024. Society for General Psychology and Interdisciplinary Inquiry, Fulbright Portugal, and Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia awardee. His research interests include lay beliefs about science (i.e., what people believe that science can or cannot explain and why), motivated beliefs in science (i.e., the contexts in which people are more prone to accepting scientific explanations), representation of social groups (i.e., how people integrate information to provide judgments on shared homogeneity vs. heterogeneity across group members), epistemic trespassing (i.e., when people provide judgments on domains beyond those in which they are experts), intuitive mind-body dualism (i.e., a natural tendency to see the world as split in material and immaterial portions), and face perception (i.e., features driving the advantage in recall for own- vs. other-race faces).